Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages with Society in Argentina by Amengual, Matthew
 Amengual - Pathways to Enforcement 
1 
Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging 
Linkages with Society in Argentina 
 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 67, No. 1, 2014 




ABSTRACT: Regulations essential for improving labor standards are often ignored to the 
detriment of workers.  In many countries, the agencies charged with enforcement lack 
resources and are subject to political interference.  How can inspectors in flawed 
bureaucracies overcome these barriers and enforce labor regulations?  Based on case 
studies of subnational variation in Argentina, this article develops a theory to explain 
enforcement in places with weak and politicized labor inspectorates.  The framework 
focuses on two factors: the strength of linkages between bureaucrats and allied civil 
society organizations, and the level of administrative resources in the bureaucracy.  
Linkages facilitate routinized resource sharing and the construction of pro-enforcement 
coalitions, and administrative resources determine whether bureaucrats use societal 
resources passively or strategically.  By identifying pathways to enforcement that are 
obscured by dominant approaches to studying labor inspection, this research opens up 
new possibilities for crafting strategies to improve labor standards. 
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In many countries, firms violate labor regulations more often than they comply 
with them.2  As a result, labor standards suffer even when there are strong laws on the 
books.  Researchers have shown that labor inspectors can counter these violations 
through enforcement, which strengthens labor market institutions and improves standards 
(Weil 2008; Piore and Schrank 2008; Pires 2008; Ronconi 2010; Levine, Toffel, and 
Johnson 2012).  But inspectors often fail to respond to violations, and there are 
widespread doubts about the capacity of most states to undertake enforcement.  The 
dominant argument holds that since inspectorates in the vast majority of countries lack 
resources, staff, and, most importantly, independence, they are overdetermined to fail 
(ILO 2006a; ILO 2011).  Given these constraints, how can inspectors enforce labor 
regulations?  
This paper explores the possibilities for enforcement in weak and politicized 
states through a study of labor inspection in Argentina, which is an ideal context in which 
to research enforcement because labor law is national, but inspection is organized 
federally and differs across subnational jurisdictions.  Most inspectorates in the country 
suffer from the common pathologies that are known to undermine enforcement: 
widespread political interference, limited resources, and endemic corruption. In these 
ways, Argentina has many of the “flaws” that make it appear to lack the preconditions for 
enforcement emphasized in the literature.  The expectation from dominant arguments 
about labor inspection is that regulators should universally fail.  A closer look, however, 
reveals broad variation in enforcement over time, across subnational units, and across 
industries.  This outcome departs from the expectations of standard theories and provides 
                                                
2 c.f. (ILO 2009) on unregistered work in  Latin America. 
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an opportunity to examine ways in which enforcement can be promoted in countries with 
imperfect labor inspectorates and weak institutions. 
To account for enforcement despite constraints, this paper proposes a framework 
built around the interaction of two variables: linkages between the state and society, and 
the administrative resources of the inspectorate.  A key insight from this analysis, which 
draws on theories of state-society relations, is that enforcement is often contingent upon 
whether and how labor inspectors mobilize resources outside of the state.  Politicized 
bureaucracies are not all subject to the same kinds of political interference; at times, pro-
enforcement groups gain preferential access to the state, and in turn, regulators can use 
these groups to make up for state weaknesses.  In contrast to standard expectations, lack 
of independence in these cases can promote, rather than undermine, state action.  This 
finding suggests that research on labor inspection should be reoriented from a narrow 
focus only on building independent inspectorates that are autonomous, and towards 
understanding how ties form between regulators and their allies, as well as how to reform 
enforcement bureaucracies.3  Ultimately, the argument advanced in this paper helps 
identify new opportunities for developing enforcement capacity that can improve labor 
standards in a wide variety of contexts. 
Regulation and Enforcement 
Research on comparative labor regulation has been focused primarily on 
accounting for variation in legal frameworks across countries.  For example, prompted by 
the rise of neoliberalism in Latin America, scholars sought to explain the persistence of 
                                                
3 This finding is very much aligned with the conclusions of recent studies of labor inspection in the context 
of advanced industrial countries.  See: (Hardy and Howe 2009; Fine and Gordon 2010). 
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the labor rights provisions kept in place during a period of deregulation (Etchemendy and 
Palermo 1998; Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005; Cook 2007).  Domestic political 
coalitions and legacies from authoritarian periods proved to have as much, if not more, of 
an effect on domestic legislation than the advocacy of international organizations to 
liberalize labor markets.  Although studies of policymaking were important corrections of 
the view of convergence around deregulation, they were incomplete because regulatory 
changes often failed to translate into practices in the labor market (Anner 2008).  For 
example, half of the workers in Latin America are in the “informal” sector, meaning that 
they do not benefit from many protections of labor law (ILO 2008). The intense battles 
that were fought over changes in regulatory laws were not the end, but rather just the 
beginning of politics.  Designing the institutions of labor markets is only part of the story; 
enforcement and making those institutions work in practice is equally important.  
Labor inspection is at the center of the challenge of implementing regulations. 
Inspectorates are specialized agencies tasked with enforcing labor law and in many 
instances, supplying information and support to workers and employers to make 
compliance possible (Von Richthofen 2002).4  The organization of inspectorates varies 
considerably around the world—some countries divide responsibility for distinct aspects 
of labor law among separate agencies (e.g. the Wage and Hour Division and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the United States Department of 
Labor), while other countries have general agencies that are charged with overseeing a 
wide range of laws (e.g. the Ministry of Labor’s inspection service in Brazil).  In the 
latter set of countries, including Argentina, inspectors regularly visit workplaces to assess 
                                                
4 See ILO Convention 81 for a general description of labor inspection. 
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compliance with the full range of labor legislation, receive workers with complaints 
about violations, and mediate conflicts between workers and management.  Inspectors 
also serve as gateways to other parts of the state apparatus, bringing cases in courts and 
referring employers to government services (such as worker training).  Due to their key 
role in strengthening weak institutions, scholars have begun to examine inspectorates in 
industrializing countries that have high levels of non-compliance (Marshall 2007; Piore 
and Schrank 2008; Pires 2008; Schrank 2009; Ronconi 2010).  These studies have 
demonstrated that enforcement, when it does occur, can have an impact on labor market 
outcomes.  However, as suggested above, there are many constraints on labor inspectors 
in practice, thus limiting their actions and impact.  
There are two dominant approaches to explaining why enforcement occurs in 
some cases and not in others.  The first set of explanations examines political control of 
the enforcement agency—from both “above” and “below” (Moe 1985; McCubbins, Noll, 
and Weingast 1987; Ronconi 2012).  These theories focus either on the interaction 
between regulators and political leaders in terms of principal-agent relationships, or on 
the direct demands that groups, such as unions, make on bureaucracies to hold them 
accountable.  Since interest groups do not directly assist the state in the tasks of 
enforcement, these political explanations tend to have difficulty accounting for 
enforcement in places with low levels of state capacity, in which “throughput” from 
demand to response is problematic (Abers and Keck 2009). 
The importance of state capacity leads to a second set of explanations, dominant 
in policy debates, which center on the internal organization of the labor inspectorate.  
Instead of focusing on the political will for enforcement, scholars examine whether or not 
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the state has the ability to enforce.  Cases of failure to protect workers stress the absence 
of state capacity(Bensusán 2006; c.f.Cooney 2007; Bernhardt, McGrath, and DeFilippis 
2008; Seidman 2009).  For example, Seidman (2009, p. 385) argues “even if Lesotho 
wanted to enforce its laws and improve working conditions, it is hardly in a position to do 
so” due to its “impoverished, weak and unstable” government institutions.  Similarly, the 
ILO’s recent report on labor inspection voiced concern about the “severe strains” that 
scarce resources have placed on the “professionalism, independence, and impartiality of 
inspectors” (ILO 2006b p. 4).  By contrast, cases of successful enforcement in the 
literature tend to emphasize a set of bureaucratic characteristics that provide the 
inspectorate with high degrees of internal coherence (c.f. Piore and Schrank 2008; Pires 
2008; Schrank 2009).   
The theoretical foundations of this explanation derive from the Weberian ideal of 
the bureaucracy and an account of state capacity built around autonomy (Skocpol 1985; 
Evans and Rauch 1999).  Autonomy is defined as the ability of a state to take actions on 
its own accord and to resist the influence of organized interests through unsanctioned 
channels.  For an inspectorate to be autonomous, it needs specific elements, such as 
meritocracy, civil service protection, long-term career prospects, dedicated employment 
to the state, rational rules, and hierarchy.  Flawed inspectorates are those that are missing 
these characteristics.    Autonomy is not sufficient for enforcement, but it appears 
necessary because when bureaucracies are politicized (i.e. when they can be directly 
influenced by organized interests working outside of formal hierarchical channels), 
resources are redirected for patronage, and powerful actors block state action (Geddes 
1994).  According to this set of theories, when inspectorates lack the organizational 
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features leading to autonomy, enforcement should fail. The policy implication of this 
argument is that the path to enforcing labor regulation must entail far-reaching reforms 
towards building autonomy, and all other concerns are secondary. 
The political control and bureaucratic autonomy approaches outlined above 
provide an important starting point for explaining enforcement.  Their weakness, 
however, lies in the way they assume that resources for enforcement are generated 
primarily through the organization of the bureaucracy.  Both approaches can only account 
for enforcement in places where regulatory agencies have the internal capability to 
respond to demands and resist political interference by powerful actors that seek to avoid 
regulations.  Variation in enforcement across sectors of the economy in these cases 
derives mainly from choices made by political elites, technical planning, or rationing 
processes by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980).  As suggested above, however, even 
if there is the will to enforce labor laws among elected officials and street-level agents, 
there is no way to do so without capabilities inside the state.  In addition, the bureaucratic 
autonomy line of argument bundles the administrative resources of the inspectorate with 
organizational coherence.  As a result, this theory homogenizes all bureaucracies that lack 
features of autonomy—treating those with high levels of administrative resources the 
same as those with low levels.  In short, dominant explanations for the enforcement of 
labor law are designed only for contexts in which states are strong in a specific sense: 
professional inspectors, bureaucratic coherence, low levels of political interference, and 
substantial resources.  This limitation is significant because most inspectorates around the 
world do not meet these criteria (ILO 2011).  The challenge, therefore, is to develop a 
theory that can account for the enforcement that does occur in places with weak and 
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politicized inspectorates.  By doing so, it will be possible to identify practices that can 
enhance enforcement and, consequently, the impact of regulation on labor standards. 
This paper advances one such approach, which draws upon insights from work on 
state-society relations and state capacity that have not been brought into debates on labor 
inspection (Mann 1993; Evans 1996; Ostrom 1996; Tendler 1997; Schneider 1998). A 
central claim in the argument advanced in this paper is that, in order to explain why 
enforcement occurs in some places and not others, it is necessary to examine whether, 
and how, bureaucrats generate resources for enforcement through their relationships 
with civil society organizations (broadly defined to include labor unions, neighborhood 
groups, and business associations).  This claim builds on the work of scholars who have 
shown that state capacity is not just a function of bureaucratic organization, but also 
related to the ties that states have with society. 5 The framework highlights the interaction 
of two variables: 1) the linkages between bureaucrats and civil society organizations that 
support enforcement, and 2) the administrative resources in the bureaucracy.  These two 
factors are described below, followed by an analysis of enforcement in two Argentine 
provinces that assesses the ability of the framework to account for variation.   
In order to enforce regulations, inspectors must be able to undertake three key 
actions.  First, labor inspectors need information about violations in an economic sector 
or geographic area.  This information can be gathered actively, by sending inspectors out 
to firms, or passively, by waiting for individuals and civil society organizations to bring 
the information to the state.  Second, labor inspectors must be able to process the 
information and craft a response that creates incentives for firms to comply and that 
                                                
5 See, for example: (Evans 1996; Ostrom 1996; Tendler 1997) 
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enables them to respond to those incentives.  Third, labor inspectors must be able to resist 
efforts by organized interests to block enforcement.  Compared with firm owners or 
managers for whom regulations can impose costs or constraints, the beneficiaries of 
regulations are generally diffuse or in a position of weakness. State agencies, therefore, 
need some way to counter the power imbalance.  While recognizing the complexities of 
regulation, distilling it into this stylized process helps clarify how competing explanations 
account for the constituent components of enforcement.   
One key factor influencing inspectors’ ability to undertake these actions is the 
structure of state-society linkages, which consist of routinized processes of consultation 
and agreements that facilitate direct interaction between labor inspectors and civil society 
organizations that promote enforcement.  Linkages derive from political alliances 
between regulators and groups in society.  They determine whether regulators can 
mobilize the resources of particular groups and, therefore, they play a central role in 
whether or not inspectors can undertake the key tasks of enforcement.  First, linkages 
enable information about violations to flow into the bureaucracy from informed groups 
outside the state.  Second, linkages facilitate the sharing of material resources that 
bureaucrats need to respond to violations.  Third, linkages between labor inspectors and 
civil society organizations that share the joint project of enforcement help bureaucrats 
overcome resistance by organized interests.  In a weak and politicized bureaucracy 
lacking autonomy, the internal organization of the bureaucracy cannot be counted on to 
prevent political interference.  In most regulatory systems, violators always have a seat at 
the table and, therefore, an opportunity to influence bureaucrats.  In contrast, 
beneficiaries of enforcement are often either in a position of weakness (i.e. the employer 
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has the power to fire the worker or withhold wages) or are diffuse (i.e. the benefits of 
generalized compliance are shared by many workers in the industry).  Therefore, linkages 
with pro-regulation groups create opportunities for building micro-level coalitions across 
state and society that can be used to resist efforts to block enforcement.  
The establishment of linkages to organizations in society that support enforcement 
and have resources can play a critical role in enabling weak bureaucracies to generate the 
three key capabilities.  For example, unions can provide intelligence about labor law 
violations, offer transportation to inspectors, and be countervailing forces when firms 
resist enforcement efforts.  Without linkages, mobilization of such resources becomes 
frustrated or completely blocked, leaving weak and politicized inspectors on their own 
(even if there is a strong union).  Therefore, the impact of a union in a particular industry, 
to a large degree, is contingent on the linkages it has with regulators because they open 
up informal channels of influence that can translate political support into enforcement. 
Similarly, the functioning of linkages depends on societal groups having resources to 
offer the state.  If inspectors have ties with a union but the union does not have 
information on violations or the ability to subsidize the state, enforcement will be 
hindered.  In sum, linkages shape the arena of politics within the state and influence 
operations of the state.  This dual role differentiates the concept of linkages from the 
apolitical way state-society ties are treated in the literature on statist development 
(c.f.Evans 1995; Montero 2001).  
A second key factor in explaining enforcement is the level of administrative 
resources inside the state.  Administrative resources include the bureaucracy’s staff, 
material resources (cars, computers, etc.), and planning capabilities.  Again, it is helpful 
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to analyze this factor in terms of its influence on enforcement tasks—gathering 
information and crafting a response to violations.  Staff, transportation, and information 
systems allow regulators to gather information on their own and to organize responses to 
violations that regulators uncover.  At the extreme, an inspectorate with almost no 
resources will become irrelevant, and societal forces will completely dominate.   
Administrative resources do not, however, have a direct effect on enforcement.  
Instead, enforcement capacity is jointly determined by the structure of state-society 
linkages that influence access to resources outside the state, as well as by administrative 
resources inside the state.  The expectation that derives from this argument is that when 
inspectorates have low levels of administrative resources, enforcement will be society-
dependent.  As a result, the intensity of enforcement will be determined by the existence 
of a societal group with resources to support the state and linkages between that group 
and the inspectors.  In such cases, whether enforcement is sustained over time will 
depend on the durability of the linkages.  In contrast, when administrative resources are 
greater, regulators are less dependent on societal groups.  In these circumstances, 
alignments between state and society result in high intensity, co-produced, enforcement.  
In addition, the allocation of enforcement does not have to simply mirror the inputs from 
linked groups in society.  Even in bureaucracies without autonomy, administrative 
resources create the possibility that enforcement can be shaped by policy, as well as by 
political input from societal groups.  
This argument builds on, and refines, dominant approaches to explaining 
enforcement of labor regulations in three ways.  First, whereas commonly used theories 
homogenize all labor inspectorates that depart from the ideal, the argument advanced in 
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this paper unbundles the political independence of the inspectorate from its operational 
capacity.6  Second, in contrast with theories that obscure the influence of societal 
organizations on inspectors by allowing bureaucratic autonomy or the discretion of street-
level agents (e.g. Lipsky 1980) to do a large portion of the work in explaining outcomes, 
my argument employs the concept of linkages to reveal differences in the structures of 
porous bureaucracies.  By doing so, it corrects the view that political interference always 
prevents enforcement, opening up the possibility of capture leading to enforcement.  
Third, unlike political approaches that are silent regarding the key steps between 
demands and state action when hierarchical control is weak, the argument advanced in 
this paper provides a way to integrate political and administrative challenges that face 
labor inspectorates.  By doing so, it teases out the difference between lack of political 
will and lack of ability.  In addition, it helps identify how political support for 
enforcement can have highly different outcomes depending on whether that support 
translates into ties with capable partners in society.  Ultimately, the argument develops a 
fuller account of state enforcement capacity than is commonly applied to labor regulation.  
Research Methods 
This paper draws upon data I collected from over sixteen months of field research 
in Argentina during 2008 and 2009, including over 190 semi-structured interviews with 
government officials, labor leaders, and managers; an original survey of 169 labor 
inspectors across six provinces; a review of over 1,400 articles about labor regulation in 
                                                
6 The practice of analyzing bureaucracies primarily by examining their approximation to the autonomous 
ideal is not unique to the literature on labor inspection.  Research on inspection largely follows dominant 
theories of state capacity (e.g. Evans 1995). Therefore, the argument advanced in this paper departs from 
the literature on the developmental state by adding dimensions beyond autonomy through which to analyze 
state capacity. 
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local newspapers; as well as data and documentary evidence from government sources.7  
Using these data, I constructed case studies that examine the process of enforcement in a 
variety of industries across Argentine provinces, varying in terms of political party, level 
of socioeconomic development, and industrial structures.  Working at this micro-level 
provides a way to locate causal mechanisms at work and to measure key explanatory 
variables as well as enforcement levels.   
My approach to analyzing enforcement differs from studies of labor inspection 
that either use primarily quantitative indicators (e.g. numbers of inspectors) or eschew 
measuring levels of enforcement altogether (e.g. opting only for comparison of 
enforcement styles, such as whether inspectors tend to be flexible and instruct firms that 
fail to comply, or inflexible and penalize firms).8  Both approaches are problematic.  
Using only a small number of quantifiable indicators of enforcement levels leaves out 
much of what regulators do in practice and can result in tremendous measurement error.  
Focusing only on enforcement styles provides little traction for comparing how much 
enforcement there is in a particular industry or place.  In this paper, I contrast these 
conventional measurement approaches with an alternative that considers patterns of 
enforcement (e.g. how enforcement is distributed), as well as relative intensity of 
                                                
7 The interviews lasted between twenty minutes and over four hours; the majority were recorded and 
transcribed.  The survey was a written 69-point confidential questionnaire given to inspectors with 
permission of the provincial authorities.  The inspectors filled out the questionnaire and returned them to 
the leadership of the inspectorate in envelopes.  Four of the provinces (Córdoba, the Federal Capital, Santa 
Fe, and Tucumán) were selected for case studies in comparative analysis and two were added (Corrientes 
and Santa Cruz) to vary on political party in power, region, and provincial GDP.  Overall, approximately 
40% of the provincial labor inspectors in Argentina were surveyed.  This article draws primarily on data 
from Córdoba and the Federal Capital.  Response rates were approximately 63% in the Federal Capital and 
67% in Córdoba, driven mainly by the fact that not all inspectors are in the office (some are in the field) at 
any given time. The newspaper searches used a variety of keywords in nine newspaper archives from 1999 
to 2009. 
8 For example, see: (Marshall 2007; Ronconi 2010; Murillo, Ronconi, and Schrank 2011; Ronconi 2012) on 
quantitative, and (Piore and Schrank 2008; Pires 2008) on style.  For an analysis of the difficulties of 
aggregation in measuring enforcement, see: (Coslovsky, Pires, and Silbey 2011) 
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enforcement at the industry level by drawing on a wide variety of data sources (e.g. 
numbers of inspections, first-hand accounts of enforcement strategies, and assessments of 
which firms are included).  Through the case studies, I show that such a measurement 
strategy is better suited for identifying important differences in enforcement.   
The context of the study is Argentina during the period of economic growth 
(2003-9) after its last major economic crisis.  This period is especially useful for studying 
enforcement because there had been a broad failure of labor market institutions—with 
informality peaking at over 50%—thus  bringing into greater relief variation in the 
responses of regulators.9  In addition, in 2003, there was a rejection of the deregulatory 
policies of the 1990s, a shift to the left with the election of Néstor Kirchner, and a 
resurgence of union strength (Etchemendy and Collier 2007).  Yet, as described above, 
the ability of the Argentine state to translate these political changes into stronger labor 
market institutions seemed unlikely without a massive reform of its inspectorates.  
Although these changes were national, labor inspection falls primarily under the 
jurisdiction of provincial governments, thereby creating a wide range of inspector 
responses to increased non-compliance.  The uneven state action generates a series of 
puzzles through which competing explanations of enforcement can be evaluated using 
case comparisons.  Since this variation was nested within the same national context, it 
controls for a variety of variables—including labor legislation, structures of union 
organization, and macro-economic conditions—and allows for a high degree of 
comparability across cases (Snyder 2001).   
                                                
9 Estimate from the Ministry of Labor 
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In this paper, I present evidence from two provinces: Córdoba and the Federal 
Capital.10   These two provinces are similar with respect to key explanations found in the 
literature.  As will be described in more detail below, neither province had anything 
resembling an autonomous inspectorate.  Moreover, during the time period of the study, 
both provinces had elected governments that were broadly in favor of implementing labor 
laws and broadly similar rates of union participation.11  Notwithstanding these similarities, 
there were puzzling differences in enforcement that cannot be accounted for using 
standard approaches.   
The analysis leverages within- and across-case variation by focusing on patterns 
of enforcement, which are the ways in which enforcement is allocated in the economy.  
In Córdoba, enforcement occurred, but inspectors were highly dependent on labor unions.  
The pattern of enforcement was society-dependent, which can be traced back to strong 
inspector-union linkages combined with low levels of administrative resources.  To better 
understand this pattern and to more clearly identify the drivers of enforcement, I contrast 
two industries—brick-kilns and metal manufacturing—that vary dramatically in terms of 
violations, union strength, and enforcement intensity.  In the Federal Capital, inspectors 
also leaned heavily on civil society organizations for enforcement, but the range of 
organizations was greater and the inspectors’ ways of using them were different from 
those in Córdoba.  The latter pattern, which more resembled co-production than 
                                                
10 Although the Federal Capital is not a province, it functions as one for the purposes of labor inspection.  
11 Córdoba’s governor was from the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ), which has traditionally been aligned 
with unions, and the head of the Federal Capital was from the center-left Alianza Party.  For a discussion of 
the relationship between the PJ and the unions, see: (Levitsky 2003).  Estimates of unionization come from 
the author’s analysis of a household survey (SIEMPRO) conducted in 2001, which asked if people pay 
union dues.  The responses were not statistically significantly different (43% in the Federal Capital and 
39% in Córdoba, p=0.12).  For more on SIEMPRO’s use to estimate unionization, see: (Marshall and 
Perelman 2008) 
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dependence, was the result of high levels of administrative resources combined with 
linkages to unions and non-union organizations.  To better assess this pattern of 
enforcement and to contrast the Federal Capital with Córdoba at a lower level of analysis, 
I juxtapose enforcement in the metal manufacturing and garment industries.  Metal 
manufacturing provides a direct comparison across provinces, and the garment industry 
shared key similarities with the brick-kilns in Córdoba (both had high levels of violations, 
many workers were Bolivian migrants, and unions were weak).  In sum, both provinces 
departed from expectations of the literature because relationships between state and 
society were politicized but there was variation in enforcement, which created an 
opportunity to locate drivers of enforcement that are masked by dominant explanations.  
Society-Dependent Enforcement in Córdoba 
The division of Córdoba’s Labor Secretariat (Secretaría de Trabajo, STC) 
charged with enforcing wage and hour regulations conducted over 10,000 inspections a 
year in the post-crisis period.12  Put in comparative context, there were 8.6 inspections 
per thousand residents in Córdoba’s capital—a figure that is equal to or greater than that 
of other countries (e.g. Chile 8.3, Dominican Republic 5.1, France 3.8, Mexico 0.3).13  
The STC found a substantial number of violations (approximately 26% of inspections 
resulted in infractions in 2008).  These inspections triggered a process through which 
regulators negotiate a plan for the firm to come into compliance or apply a fine to the 
firm.  In some cases, regulators forced firms to pay back wages or suspended operations 
                                                
12 The STC is divided into health and safety inspectors and “laboral” (wage and hour) inspectors who focus 
on all issues unrelated to health and safety.  This paper focuses on the latter. 
13 Inspections per capita are used instead of per worker because of the large uncertainty in estimates of the 
number of workers in Argentine provinces.  Federal Capital and Córdoba data are for 2007. Chile: (Rosado 
Marzan 2010); Dominican Republic: Secretaría de Estado de Trabajo; France: ILO; Mexico: (Romero 
Gudiño 2008). 
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in unsafe workshops.14  Using common indicators, it would appear that Córdoba’s 
inspectorate was enforcing labor regulations at high levels.  However, as will be shown 
below, these numbers provide only a partial view of enforcement, which is highly uneven 
in the economy. 
  
                                                
14 Dozens of interviews with labor leaders, business leaders, and officials. 
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Table 1: Pedagogical Inspections (N=64) 
During inspections, how often do 
you: Province Never Sometimes 
Almost 
Always 
1. Orient managers about their 
obligations 
Córdoba 3 % 24 % 72% 
Federal Capital 9 % 31 % 60% 
2. Orient workers about their 
obligations 
Córdoba 0 % 7  % 93% 
Federal Capital 3 % 40 % 57% 
3. Make suggestions to businesses 
to improve their management 
system or production? 
Córdoba 7 % 48 % 44% 
Federal Capital 51 % 31 % 17% 
 
Table 2: Theories of Non-Compliance (N=64) 
Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?  
Province Agree Disagree 
1. The majority of businesses that do not comply 
do not have an understanding of the law 
Córdoba 14% 86% 
Federal Capital 20% 80% 
2. The majority of firms that do not comply do not 
have the ability to pay all of the costs of 
compliance. 
Córdoba 28% 72% 
Federal Capital 29% 71% 
3. The majority of firms that do not comply do not 
want to pay the costs of compliance. 
Córdoba 76% 24% 
Federal Capital 76% 24% 
4. Inspectors should be more demanding with 
profitable firms than with firms having 
difficulties? 
Córdoba 36% 64% 
Federal Capital 37% 63% 
5. Inspectors should be less demanding when there 
is an economic crisis?  
Córdoba 48% 52% 
Federal Capital 39% 61% 
6. Sometimes, it is more important that to advise a 
firm than to sanction it? 
Córdoba 79% 21% 
Federal Capital 56% 44% 
7. Sometimes, it is more important that workers 
have a job than that a firm complies with all of the 
laws?  
Córdoba 37% 63% 
Federal Capital 33% 67% 
 
In addition to the number of inspections, studies of labor inspection have also 
emphasized styles as important components of enforcement.  It would be difficult, 
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however, to fit the STC into any single “style” of inspection.  Within the STC, neither 
pedagogical nor punitive tactics dominated.15  For example, some officials argue that 
“inspectors have to give advice”16 and that there is always “persuasion before 
coercion,”17 while others contend that “it is not the function of the inspector to be a 
teacher.”18  Inspector survey results support the semi-structured interviews (see Tables 1 
and 2).  On the one hand, inspectors responded that they believe that (in the majority of 
cases) the source of non-compliance is not the inability of firms to comply, but rather the 
managers’ unwillingness to do so (Table 2, questions 1-3).  On the other hand, inspectors 
were split as to whether or not they should be flexible with firms having economic 
difficulties (Table 2, questions 4 and 5).  In addition, inspectors indicated that they should 
(Table 2, question 6), and often do (Table 1), take steps to instruct managers and workers 
in order to help bring firms into compliance.  In sum, inspectors craft a variety of 
responses to violations, combining elements of enforcement styles that are often seen as 
alternatives in the literature.  Furthermore, since the inspectors in the Federal Capital 
have similarly eclectic enforcement styles (as I will describe below), comparing the styles 
of inspectors does not expose important variation across cases.  To more completely 
unpack enforcement, it is necessary to go beyond indicators of total numbers of 
inspections or enforcement styles and, instead, to focus on patterns and industry-levels. 
Using data from the survey of inspectors, Table 3 shows the industries where 
enforcement is concentrated, along with an indicator of which unions request the most 
                                                
15 Similarly, Pires (2011) finds that there is no single approach dominant in the Brazilian inspectorate, but 
rather conflicting visions of enforcement strategies. 
16 Interview: C45, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 6/19/2008 
17 Interview: C43, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 6/25/2008 
18 Interview: C22, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 06/23/08 &  03/05/09 & 03/07/09 
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inspections.19  These data show that there was a very strong relationship between union 
demands and enforcement; the correlation between unions that make requests and 
inspections is high (0.92).  In addition, according to internal data from the STC, in 2007 
and 2008, 73% of inspections were at the request of unions, and 27% were either 
programmed or from individual complaints.  Therefore, the inspectors themselves only 
selected a small portion of the firms that were visited.  In sum, not only is the distribution 
of enforcement skewed towards industries with active unions, but enforcement occurred 
largely in firms selected by union leaders. 
Table 3: Distribution of Inspections and Union Requests in Córdoba (N=29) 
Sector Which sectors are 
inspected the most? 
Which unions 





Commercial 21% 20% 1% 
Construction 17% 17% 0% 
Restaurants 11% 6% 5% 
Metal 10% 15% -5% 
Gas Stations 7% 7% 0% 
Shoes 6% 7% -1% 
Cleaning 4% 2% 2% 
Health Clinic 4% 5% -1% 
Hair Cutting 3% 2% 0% 
Private Security 3% 2% 1% 
Transportation 3% 7% -5% 
…    
 
Table 4: Distribution of Inspections and Union Requests in the Federal Capital (N=34) 
Sector Which sectors are 
inspected the most? 
Which unions 





Construction 19% 20% -1% 
Commercial 18% 8% 9% 
Textile 12% 8% 3% 
                                                
19 The survey results are consistent with available data from the STC of the number of union-led 
inspections over a five month period; nine out of ten of the top unions identified by inspectors in the survey 
were also in the top eleven unions requesting inspections in the archival data. 
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Restaurants 8% 3% 5% 
Service 7% 0% 7% 
Industry 7% 0% 7% 
Casinos 4% 0% 4% 
Call Center 4% 0% 4% 
Nursing Home 4% 2% 3% 
Health Clinic 4% 5% -1% 
…    
 
Focusing in on two industry-level cases, brick-kilns and metal manufacturing, 
provides an opportunity to identify the processes that drive enforcement.  The production 
of bricks in Córdoba is a highly marginalized activity.  The basic technology and method 
of production are rudimentary—workers form mud into bricks and bake them in 
relatively small kilns.  In 2008, there were approximately 700 worksites that employed 
workers from approximately 4,000 families.20  The labor is unskilled, and over 50% of 
workers are migrants, mainly from Bolivia and Peru.  The primary market for the bricks 
was the local construction industry, which grew extremely rapidly after the crisis and 
created a spike in demand for bricks.   
Labor violations in the brick-kiln industry were pervasive and severe by all 
measures.  Rates of informality in the sector were extremely high, upwards of 96% 
(compared to the provincial average of 39%), which means that nearly all workers were 
denied their legally mandated benefits and protections (e.g. social security and severance 
pay).21  Wage violations in the industry were also common.22  Furthermore, workers lived 
in substandard encampments on the worksites, often lacking basic services such as 
                                                
20 La Voz del Interior (LV ) “Intensificarán controles en los cortaderos” 11/08/08 
21 The estimate of informality in the brick-kilns is based on an STC survey (Pizaro 2008). See also: LV 
“Flojos de papeles” 12/24/06.  Informatiliy in the province is based on the author’s calculations using the 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), which is conducted by the Argentine Ministry of Economy. 
22 LV  “El otro lado del “boom” inmobiliario” 4/16/06; “Intensificarán controles en los cortaderos” 
11/08/08; “Investigan nuevas denuncias por maltrato a bolivianos” 06/15/06  
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potable water, sewage, and electricity,23  and on multiple occasions, children were killed 
on unsafe worksites.24  In sum, this industry proved to be one of the most precarious in 
Córdoba. 
 There were two civil society associations that could have potentially pushed for 
enforcement from below.  One group, the Center for Bolivian Residents of Córdoba 
(Centro de Residentes Bolivianos en Córdoba), took the plight of the brick-kiln workers 
to a variety of government agencies seeking assistance.25  Another group, the local 
branch of the union that represents brick-kiln workers, UORLA (Unión Obrera 
Ladrillera de la República Argentina), was quite weak with only 200 workers as affiliates, 
few resources, and a relatively inactive leadership (that was displaced in 2008).26   
 Officials in the STC have been aware of the problems in the brick-kiln sector for 
years, and in the post-2003 period, a number of incidents could have potentially triggered 
enforcement.  These events included a series of investigative newspaper articles covering 
tragedies on the worksites that involved children dying due to unsafe conditions.  A 
senior official from the time recalled: “They put the issue of ‘those poor migrant Bolivian 
workers’ in fashion.”27  In addition, in 2008, the newly appointed Secretary of Labor 
made child labor a priority and created a special roundtable to address the issue, which 
was endemic in the brick-kilns.28  His plan was not met with any real resistance from the 
employers in the industry—the brick-kilns were largely unorganized and the construction 
                                                
23 LV  “Buscan normalizar situación de inmigrantes” 04/21/06 
24 LV “Clausuran por primera vez un cortadero” 11/07/08 
25 Defensor del Pueblo de la Provincia de Cordoba, “Informe Anual 2006”, 2006. 
26 Interviews: C22, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 06/23/08 &  03/05/09 & 03/07/09; and C42, Senior 
Official, STC, Córdoba, 3/9/2009;  See also: LV “Cortaderos de ladrillos, tumba para 5 niños” 12/09/09 
27 Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 3/11/2009 
28 Interview: C45, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 6/19/2008.  See also:  LV “Comisión provincial para 
eliminar el trabajo infantil” 04/10/08; “Hallan a niños que trabajan en cortaderos” 06/12/08 
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industry association has worked collaboratively with regulators across a variety of 
issues.29  An analysis using the lens of political control from above would expect that the  
stated preferences of the appointed leaders of the STC should have induced enforcement.  
 Notwithstanding these factors, enforcement levels remained very low in the brick-
kilns.  In 2007, there was a handful of inspections and a survey conducted to gather 
information about violations, but the campaign ended quickly without shutting any 
worksites.  In the second half of 2008, there were an average of 1.8 inspections a month 
in the industry, which constituted only 0.4% of all inspections conducted by the STC. 
There was also a lack of routine information gathering about specific worksites through 
civil society organizations that regulators could use to monitor the industry.  Moreover, 
the STC never crafted a strong response to violations and did not use penalties or 
pedagogy in a systematic way to improve compliance.30  The former head of the 
inspectorate concluded that “more needed to be done” for enforcement.31  Not 
surprisingly, working conditions have not improved in the industry.32 
The metal industry in Córdoba contrasts sharply with the brick-kiln industry in 
many ways, most notably in its relatively lower levels of violations and higher levels of 
enforcement.  The metal sector is made up of 1,900 firms, small and large, that 
manufacture parts for farm machinery and others industries.33  Although there were 
violations of labor laws in the metal industry—employers attempted to avoid contract 
                                                
29 Interview: C15, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Córdoba, 3/3/2009 
30 LV “Clausuran por primera vez un cortadero” 11/7/08 
31 Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 3/11/2009 
32 LV “Cortaderos de ladrillos, tumba para 5 niños” 12/09/09 
33 According to the Economic Census of 2004 there were 1,877 localities. Interview: C37, Córdoba Metal 
Components Industry Association, Córdoba, 7/15/2008 
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obligations and approximately 30% of workers are unregistered—they were below the 
provincial average and significantly less extreme than those in the brick-kilns.34 
Even though the metal industry was not the place of the most egregious or the 
highest rates of violations, it was one of the sectors in which the STC concentrated 
enforcement.  The STC gathered ample information about violations through a high rate 
of inspections.  For instance, there was an average of 28 inspections per month in the 
metal industry in 2008 (in contrast with the 1.8 inspections per month in the brick-kilns).  
With less than 2% of the workers in the province, the metal industry accounted for over 
7% of the inspections.35  Moreover, inspectors collected detailed information about the 
firms to target inspections from the metal workers’ union (UOM), which had a group of 
nine leaders who regularly checked compliance in the metal workshops and a network of 
approximately 200 delegates.  In addition, inspectors mobilized resources from UOM for 
transportation and follow-up after the inspection to see if firms complied.36  Once they 
found violations, inspectors crafted responses that used a variety of strategies, including 
negotiations over the terms in which the firms will comply.  To avoid resistance, 
inspectors involved union leaders, even at times the powerful head of UOM who was also 
a member of the provincial legislature.37 In sum, inspectors undertook the three key tasks 
of enforcement—gathering information, crafting responses, and overcoming resistance.  
There was also a decrease in violations that local observers attributed, in part, to the 
                                                
34 Author’s estimate using EPH.  Interview: C46, Metal Workers’ Union (UOM), Córdoba, 3/18/2009 
35 Percentage of workers based on the 2001 Argentine census. “Cuadro 9.24   Total País. Población 
ocupada de 14 años o más por provincia según rama de actividad económica.” 
36 Interviews: C07, Metal Workers’ Union (UOM), Córdoba, 3/18/2009; C46, Metal Workers’ Union 
(UOM), Córdoba, 3/18/2009.  Se also: LV “La reactivación también sumó nuevas afiliaciones a los gremios” 
10/16/06 
37 Interviews: C38, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 7/18/2008; C43, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 6/25/2008; C07, 
Metal Workers’ Union (UOM), Córdoba, 3/18/2009 
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STC.38   However, inspectors only acted when the union made requests and provided 
resources.  Despite the fact that enforcement in the metal industry was uneven, it still was 
at a much higher level than enforcement in the brick-kiln industry.   
Explaining Enforcement in Córdoba  
Enforcement clearly occurs in Córdoba, but it follows a particular pattern in 
which inspectors are highly dependent on union resources.  How can this pattern of 
enforcement be explained?  First, enforcement cannot be easily accounted for using 
standard bureaucratic arguments.  Quite simply, the STC lacks most of the features of 
bureaucratic autonomy.  Although most inspectors have civil service protection, they are 
largely patronage hires chosen not based on merit but for their political connections.  In 
addition to their official duties, most hold jobs outside of the inspectorate, which are 
tolerated by senior officials who recognize the need for inspectors to (informally) 
supplement their low salaries.39  The bureaucracy is governed more by “uses and customs” 
than by “written down rules,”40 with significant space left to direct influence by 
organized interests.  In short, enforcement was not made possible by bureaucratic 
autonomy. 
Second, standard political approaches could not explain enforcement.  If the 
principals of the STC were simply pro-labor and directed inspectors to enforce broadly, 
inspectors should have responded to the problems in the brick-kilns.  The leadership of 
the STC articulated a policy of helping the brick workers, there was no strong employer 
association that could push back, and stories about the brick-kilns in the media 
                                                
38 LV “Acción de la UOM por trabajo en negro” 12/17/2004.  These estimates align with survey data from 
the EPH.   
39 Interview: C31, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 7/17/2008 
40 Interview: C42, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 3/9/2009 
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embarrassed the administration.  Enforcement in the metal industry, on the other hand, 
should have been more problematic; the metal industry association had enough political 
weight in the provincial government to gain key cabinet appointments, and the union 
often stood in opposition to the government.  Consequently, the costs of enforcement for 
STC’s principals should have been greater in the metal manufacturing industry than in 
the brick-kiln industry.  Yet these differences clearly did not determine the enforcement 
levels.  
An explanation of enforcement in Córdoba needs to account for its dominant 
features: by all measures there is enforcement, but it is skewed towards industries with 
large numbers of union demands.  One factor that prevented the inspectors from 
enforcing without union support was the STC’s low levels of administrative resources.   
Inspectors had extremely short supplies for transportation to visit worksites—in 2008 
there were only two cars for approximately 50 inspectors—which limited the ability of 
the inspectorate to take action without borrowing the transportation of unions.41  
Moreover, the inspectors had no information management system that would allow it to 
assess which firms had been inspected and to know the results.  Inspectors worked few 
hours because their salaries were low and they had to hold second jobs.  As a result, even 
though the number of inspectors met international standards, manpower was 
inadequate.42  In addition, the quality of inspector training was relatively low, and there 
was no minimum educational requirement to be an inspector; only 10% of inspectors 
                                                
41 Interview: C22, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09 
42 The wage and hour division had approximately 50 inspectors, or 35,000 economically active workers per 
inspector (including health and safety).  This is in range of the ILO recommendations for inspectors per 
worker and at a medium level compared with other Argentine provinces. 
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completed university and 4% of inspectors went only to elementary school.43  
Consequently, there was a group of inspectors who could not respond to complex 
problems without additional support.    
Low level of administrative resources helps explain why the STC failed to enforce 
regulation in industries in which there was clearly a need for enforcement, such as in the 
brick-kiln industry.  Quite simply, on their own, the inspectors did not have the capability 
to gather information about violations and to organize a response that could bring firms 
into compliance.  They could not reproduce political demands or social need for 
enforcement with the resources they had.  Given these substantial limitations, it becomes 
clear why, even when appointed officials made child labor a priority, the inspectorate did 
not effectively react and increase enforcement levels in the brick-kiln industry.  
With such constraints, it is surprising that inspectors in the STC were able to 
enforce labor laws at all.  Administrative resources, however, are not the only component 
of state capacity.  To explain for enforcement, it is necessary to take into account a 
second factor: the structure of linkages between inspectors and civil society organizations. 
Inspectors in Córdoba have strong linkages with labor unions (and only with labor 
unions). Union leaders have unfettered access to the inspectors and can contact them 
directly.44  For example, inspectors routinely wait for labor union leaders before making 
decisions about where to conduct inspections at the beginning of each day.  As a result, 
                                                
43To put the education levels into context, MERCOSUR countries agreed in 2006 that all labor inspectors 
should have completed university.  For example, in the Dominican Republic all wage and hour inspectors 
are lawyers and in Brazil all inspectors have college degrees and 34% have graduate degrees (Pires 2008; 
Schrank 2009). 
44 Multiple interviews, including: C38, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 7/18/2008; C43, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 
6/25/2008 
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there are no barriers between inspectors and union leaders that prevent regulators from 
mobilizing specific resources outside of the state. 
Linkages help explain the capacity of inspectors to undertake the key tasks of 
enforcement.  Regulators gain information from unions throughout the entire process: 
before inspections when union leaders request action; during the act of inspection when 
union leaders act as “auxiliaries”45 by interviewing workers and directing inspectors 
towards violations; as well as after inspections when union leaders follow up to see if 
firms corrected the problems.46  Unions also furnish transportation and supplement wages 
when inspectors work overtime, allowing regulators to visit firms that would otherwise 
be out of their reach.47  Inspector-union linkages also provide a way for inspectors to 
draw on the political support of unions during enforcement.  As described above in the 
metal industry, union leaders directly observe the inspection process and oversee how the 
inspector exercises his discretion.  After violations are uncovered, inspectors coordinate 
with unions to set times for the hearings in which the firm and the inspector negotiate 
how to resolve violations.  Consequently, the union can put its weight behind the 
inspector and push for strong enforcement even if a powerful firm resists.   
Table 5: Indicators of Inspector-Union Linkages (N=63) 
During Inspections, how often does a union representative: 
  Never Sometimes Almost 
Always 
1. Accompany the inspection 
Córdoba 0% 29% 71% 
Federal Capital 9% 76% 15% 
                                                
45 Interview: C43, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 6/25/2008 
46 Interview: C33, Garment Workers' Union (SOIVA), Córdoba, 6/25/2008 
47 Interview: C03, Union of Pastry, Pizza, and Alfajor Workers, Córdoba, 7/16/2008 
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2. Provide a car 
Córdoba 0% 38% 62% 
Federal Capital 24% 53% 24% 
3. Orient the inspector 
towards the most important 
problems 
Córdoba 14% 50% 36% 
Federal Capital 26% 56% 18% 
4. Help the inspector collect 
information from the 
workers 
Córdoba 0% 59% 41% 
Federal Capital 61% 36% 3% 
5. Assist the inspector with 
knowledge of the collective 
bargaining agreement 
Córdoba 0% 37% 63% 
Federal Capital 18% 64% 18% 
6. Collaborate with follow-
up after the inspection 
Córdoba 0% 50% 50% 
Federal Capital 55% 39% 6% 
 
Data from the inspector survey (Table 5) provide additional evidence that 
Córdoba’s inspectors draw heavily on unions for a wide variety of resources (the 
comparative differences between the two provinces will be described in detail below). 
The majority of inspectors from Córdoba indicated that union leaders “almost always” 
accompany the inspection, provide a car, assist inspectors with information from the 
collective bargaining agreement, and collaborate with the inspectors in follow-up.  In 
short, the existence of strong linkages to capable unions makes enforcement possible in 
the absence of both bureaucratic autonomy and administrative resources. 
Focusing on linkages instead of unfiltered civil society demands also helps 
explain why enforcement is tied to unions, not to pressure “from below” from all sources, 
and helps clarify the role of politics in providing an overall direction for enforcement.  
There are approximately 12,000 civil society organizations in Córdoba, over two-thirds 
of which work on social assistance, issues related to workers, or with vulnerable groups.48  
                                                
48 (Luna and Cecconi 2004) 
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Yet, labor inspectors do not draw on these organizations for resources due to a lack of 
structures that cross the state-society divide to facilitate collaboration.  Politics of linkage 
formation were most potent through the partisan alliance between the governing party 
and the unions, which made some, but not all, linkages viable.  All governors in Córdoba 
since 1999 have been from the Peronist Partido Justicialista, which has a historic 
partisan alliance with labor unions. While non-union organizations could put pressure on 
the STC and attempt to hold it accountable, they could not enable the STC to act; 
pressure from the outside of the state does not automatically translate into state capacity.  
The failure of enforcement in the brick-kilns industry is a striking illustration of the lack 
of linkages between inspectors and civil society organizations that are not unions.  The 
Center for Bolivian Residents, which was not a union, attempted to hold the STC 
accountable, but collaboration between the Center and inspectors never developed in a 
way that could enable enforcement.  The inspectors only maintained linkages with the 
union.  There was a disagreement between the Center and the union over which group 
truly represented the interests of workers, and the Center was unable to displace the union 
and establish linkages.49  
Although strong linkages undermine bureaucratic autonomy, they allow unions to 
provide a key subsidy that enables enforcement in cases where the regulatory agency 
lacks resources.  When union interests align with the regulator’s responsibility to 
implement labor laws in a particular industry, capture leads to enforcement.  But close 
examination of the pattern of enforcement in Córdoba reveals the double-edged nature of 
building enforcement capacity through linkages with a subset of organizations in society.  
                                                
49 LV “Cruce entre un abogado y el gremio” 11/08/08 
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The result, in the words of senior officials, was a “deformation” that “impedes” the STC 
from “creating a plan that is based on a map of informal work, fraudulent firms, and 
child labor” to target enforcement.50  Senior officials worried that in some cases 
inspector-union ties are so strong that hierarchical control in the agency completely 
breaks down.51  The following case, however, will demonstrate that this type of distortion 
is not inevitable, even in a highly imperfect inspectorate. 
Co-Producing Enforcement in the Federal Capital 
 In some respects, enforcement in the Federal Capital by its labor agency, the 
STBA (Subsecretaría de Trabajo), does not appear to be very different from that of 
Córdoba. Regulators conducted 30,000 inspections in 2007, resulting in a per thousand 
residents inspection rate of 9.7 (compared with 8.6 in Córdoba).52  The percentage of 
inspections that found an infraction was similar across the two provinces: 32% in the 
Federal Capital (2006)53 compared with 26% in Córdoba (2008).  In short, conventional 
measures identify few differences in enforcement between the Federal Capital and 
Córdoba.  
Although quantity of inspections might be similar, there could be differences 
across cases in terms of regulatory style.  As in Córdoba, however, there was no one 
dominant regulatory style in the Federal Capital.  The survey results indicate that 
inspectors in the Federal Capital believe most firms have the ability to comply but choose 
not to follow employment laws.  There is little variation in theories of non-compliance 
                                                
50 Interview: C45, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba 6/19/2008 
51 Interview: C31, Senior Official, STC, Córdoba, 7/17/2008 
52 The inspection rate was particularly high in 2007, but in other years it was lower than that of Córdoba. 
53 Auditoria General la Ciudad Buenos Aires. Informe Final: Dirección General de Protección del Trabajo. 
2006.  p. 23 
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between inspectors in Córdoba and those in the Federal Capital (Table 2).54  
Notwithstanding this assessment of firm motivations, some inspectors in the Federal 
Capital do employ pedagogical approaches.  For example, one senior official said 
inspectors need to “give firms education, assistance and time to register…so they can be 
able to obey the law.”55  Other senior officials disagreed, stating that “we don’t teach the 
managers because we believe that they have enough resources to hire [advisors]”56 and 
“the government inspects, it does not advise.”57  These statements closely resemble those 
of the officials in Córdoba.  The survey data does, however, indicate that there were some 
differences between the provinces, as inspectors in the Federal Capital were less likely to 
report that they give instructions to workers and management (Table 1).58   
 Overall, differences in measures of enforcement that are emphasized in the 
literature on inspection—quantity of inspections and enforcement styles—pale in 
comparison to differences in patterns of enforcement.  First, the percentage of inspections 
triggered by complaints was substantially lower in the Federal Capital than in Córdoba, 
33% in 2008.  In stark contrast with Córdoba, a minority of inspection requests in the 
Federal Capital (40% in 2005) came from unions, while the majority came from 
individuals or other government agencies.  Second, and related, the relationship between 
the industries inspected and union demands was much weaker, as shown in responses to 
the inspector survey (Table 4, the correlation is 0.62 in the Federal Capital compared with 
0.92 for Córdoba).  Available data from the STBA are consistent with the survey results.  
                                                
54 The difference in responses is only statistically significant for question 6 (p=0.04). 
55 Interview: B08, Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 9/23/2008 
56 Interview: B05, Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 10/7/2008 
57 Interview: B07, STBA, Buenos Aires, 10/1/2008 
58 Questions 2 and 3 are statistically significant (Q2 chi-squared = 10.6, p=0.005; Q3, chi-squared = 15.3, 
p=0.000) 
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For example, in 2005, 66% of all requests came from the construction union, but the 
construction industry only had 36% of all inspections.  On the other end of the spectrum, 
only 0.1% of requests were from the commercial workers’ union, but 7% of inspections 
were in the commercial sector.   Unlike in Córdoba, in the Federal Capital there has been 
a very indirect relationship between union demands and enforcement.  
 Briefly comparing the metal industry in the two provinces illustrates the 
differences in enforcement allocation.  The metal industry in the Federal Capital had 
approximately the same levels of violations as the industry in Córdoba and has always 
had the same powerful union, UOM.59  However, the metal industry has relatively few 
inspections (2% in 2005).  This was not because of lack of union demands; a union leader 
stated: “it is going to be a year since we put in five requests for inspections and we still 
haven’t gotten any response.”60   Without high levels of proactive inspections or use of 
the union requests, the STBA collects little information about violations in the metal 
industry.  As a result, the subsequent tasks of enforcement, crafting a response and 
overcoming resistance, did not occur.  In short, in the same industry, with the same union, 
and similar types of violations, enforcement levels are higher in Córdoba than in the 
Federal Capital.   
In contrast to the metal industry, the STBA reacted strongly to violations in the 
garment industry with an intense enforcement campaign in 2006 and 2007.  Garment 
                                                
59 Analysis of Encuesta Permanente de Hogares and interviews C46 and B19. 
60 Interview: B19, Metal Workers’ Union (UOM), Buenos Aires, 2/12/2009.  Interviews with union leaders 
indicate that the types of violations and their frequency are similar across provinces.  Estimates of the 
percentage of workers that were non-registered in the Federal Capital in the sector from the EPH have high 
levels of uncertainty due to the small sample size, but are approximately the same as in Córdoba, at around 
25%.  In addition, as a local measure of union strength, UOM in the Federal Capital has approximately 500 
delegates, more than that in Córdoba.  
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manufacturing in the Federal Capital accelerated rapidly after the crisis.61  By 2007, the 
industry had reached nearly 6 billion dollars in production, the great majority of which 
competed with imports in the domestic market.62  An integral part of the industry is a vast 
network of small home-based workshops that operates through a system of outsourcing 
and piecework; 74% of producers have fewer than five employees and 23% have between 
6 and 40 employees.63  It is impossible to know the precise number of workers and 
workshops, but officials estimated that in 2009 there were between 3,000 and 3,500 
workshops in the Federal Capital.64   
By all measures, the garment industry in the Federal Capital had extremely high 
levels of labor violations.  The factors that contribute to poor working conditions in all 
garment industries—relatively low skilled workers, highly fluctuating demand, and low 
levels of investment—were amplified in the Federal Capital by the large number of 
undocumented migrant workers from Bolivia.  An inspection operation in 2006 checking 
13,000 workers found that 1,600 were in conditions that approximated “slavery” and, in 
total, worker advocates estimated that 25,000 Bolivian migrants were “reduced to slavery 
in clandestine workshops.”65  An investigation from the local ombudsman found 
workshops that violated nearly every labor law: they did not meet basic health and safety 
standards, there was no legal payroll, working days began at seven in the morning and 
lasted until past midnight with only short breaks for meals, salaries were only 100 dollars 
per month, and workers were denied all legally mandated benefits.  In 2006, the safety 
                                                
61 Centro de Estudios para la Producción.  “Las marcas como motor del crecimiento de las exportaciones en 
el sector indumentaria” 2007 
62 Source: Cámara Industrial Argentina de la Indumentaria  
63 Source: (Fundación el Otro 2007).   
64 Clarín “Imágenes de los talleres clandestinos, una forma de esclavitud moderna”, 4/12/09 
65 La Nación “Aún quedan 25.000 bolivianos que trabajan como esclavos” 10/16/06 
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risks of the garment industry were brought into horrific view when a fire killed a family 
that was living in a garment workshop.66  Many features of this industry—the 
predominance of migrant workers, the extreme violations and very public tragedies, the 
small and dispersed centers of production—were comparable to those of the brick-kilns 
in Córdoba. 
In response to the fire in 2006, there was a tremendous shift in enforcement by the 
STBA.67  In the eleven days that followed the fire, a series of operations by inspectors 
closed 122 workshops.68  Within a few months, the STBA had conducted 1,700 
inspections in the sector and closed 500 clandestine workshops.  Compared with the 
reaction of the inspectorate in Córdoba to similar problems in the brick-kilns, the STBA 
clearly enforced at a much greater level.  Enforcement, however, did not end after 
saliency of the issue waned.  Instead, the STBA began a multipronged effort to reduce the 
worst forms of abuse in the garment industry.   
The STBA undertook an extensive campaign to gather information about the 
industry. Working with a civil society organization called La Alameda, which had 
widespread ties with migrant workers, the STBA targeted inspections in workshops that 
                                                
66 Página/12 “El infierno del trabajo esclavo” 3/31/06. La Nación “Mueren seis personas en un incendio” 
3/31/06. 
67 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009. Before 2006, there was a 
jurisdictional conflict between the STBA and the federal Ministry of Labor (MTESS) over the garment 
industry.  Although the STBA had jurisdiction over enforcing labor law in the Federal Capital, the MTESS 
retained jurisdiction over home-based work agreements that were common in the industry.  This conflict 
prevented the STBA from taking action earlier, but after the fire the issue was quickly resolved.  On June 
22, 2006, the government of Federal Capital formally signed an agreement (Convenio N° 14-GCBA/06) 
with the MTESS to take primary jurisdiction over home-based work. This agreement did not go into legal 
effect until the end of 2007, but its existence made it possible for the STBA to take the lead in regulating 
the garment sector. 
68 Página/12 “Tras los controles, las textiles ilegales ya se mudan al conurbano”, 4/11/06. La Nación “Tras 
el incendio, combaten el empleo ilegal” 04/01/06; “Bolivia en Buenos Aires: la vida después de las 
clausuras” 04/26/06. 
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produced for well-known local brands.  Inspectors then coordinated with La Alameda to 
send workers to look for work in these factories.  These “spies” gathered intelligence 
about labor law violations, which La Alameda then passed on to the STBA.69  The 
information that La Alameda generated through its network in the community of Bolivian 
migrants was extremely valuable; inspectors found violations in 97% of the workshops 
that La Alameda identified.70  
With the information gathered, the STBA took far-reaching steps to raise the costs 
of non-compliance for workshops that continued illegal practices, to prosecute the firms 
at the top of the supply chain that sourced from clandestine factories, and to create 
employment in cooperatives that did not exploit workers.  In the first eight months of 
2007 alone, the STBA closed down 713 workshops.71  To complement this strategy, 
inspectors, with their allies in the public prosecutors office and La Alameda, started 
mapping out the entire supply chain of the garment industry and began a campaign 
against lead firms.72  This put direct pressure on the firms, embarrassing them and 
sparking public protests in front of their stores.  The STBA also made an effort to use 
laws that hold firms responsible for the actions of their subcontractors in order to pressure 
firms further up on the supply chain.  These actions began to impose costs to firms at the 
top of the supply chain, thereby creating a greater deterrent.73  In addition to penalizing 
                                                
69 Clarín “Trabajo esclavo: usaron a espías para investigar talleres” 09/06/06; “Se infiltró en un taller ilegal 
para denunciar a una marca de ropa” 09/07/06. 
70 Source: (Auditoria General la Ciudad Buenos Aires 2006).  To put this number into context, wage and 
hour regulators in the United States’ garment industry found violations in 49% of their investigations 
between 1996 and 2000.  (Weil 2005 p. 242) 
71 Clarín “Trabajo esclavo: la Comuna denunció a seis marcas textiles” 07/31/07  
72 Interview: B66, Former Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009.  See also: Página/12 “Ropa 
infantil con manchas legales” 01/16/07; ““Nos pagaban centavos por prendas que en vidriera estaban a 30 
pesos”” 01/17/07; “Denuncian a cinco marcas deportivas por explotar a los indocumentados” 07/30/07.   
73 This practice is somewhat similar to the highly effective use of the “hot goods provision” by the U.S. 
Department of Labor to increase costs for firms that source from illegal workshops.  See: (Ibid.). 
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violators, the STBA worked with the National Institute of Industrial Technology to create 
programs to support garment production that did not exploit workers.  One program, 
which ultimately failed, gave clothing brands the opportunity to certify their supply 
chains as complying.74 A second program was successful in building a cooperative that 
became a part of La Alameda and employed 200 people who had worked in the 
clandestine factories.75  Overall, these actions are evidence of a broad effort to 
systematically address the conditions that promoted exploitation. 
Finally, the STBA was able to resist pressure against enforcement from those 
firms that had immediately benefitted from labor law violations up until the end of 2007.  
Even though workshop owners were able to bribe police for protection, there is no 
evidence that they were able to bribe labor inspectors.  The industry lobbied against 
enforcement, putting pressure on the STBA.  But the large brands made little progress in 
changing the behavior of the agency, so they shifted tactics.76  Instead of attempting to 
prevent enforcement, lead firms in the industry eventually made a failed attempt to alter 
the law to reduce their responsibility for compliance in their supply chains.77  
In sum, over a two-year period enforcement levels were sustained at 
comparatively high levels, and the actions undertaken by the STBA approximated best 
practices of labor inspection.78   Although the effort ultimately slowed down with a 
change in government at the end of 2007, for a two-year period it was substantially 
                                                
74 “Programa de Certificación INTI Compromiso Social Compartido Empresas de Indumentaria” Instituto 
Nacional de Tecnología Industrial, 2006. 
75 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009. Página/12 “De ilegales a 
cooperativistas” 12/04/07.   See also: (Lieutier 2010). 
76 Interviews: B66, Former Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009; B39, Former Senior Official, 
STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009 
77 Clarín “Ya se generó polemica por la ley contra “el trabajo esclavo”” 8/21/08.  This proposed law was 
eventually defeated. 
78 Many of the steps taken by the STBA fit in the model of “strategic inspection.” See:(Weil 2008) 
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higher than in any industry in Argentina.  While there is not sufficient data to properly 
measure impact, close observers noted an end of “total impunity” due to the enforcement 
campaigns.79   
Explaining Enforcement in the Federal Capital 
 Why was enforcement so different in the Federal Capital as compared with that in 
Córdoba?  The autonomy of the bureaucracy cannot provide an explanation.  One key 
characteristic of autonomous bureaucracies is civil service protection that promotes 
independence, but nearly all (99%) of inspectors in the STBA had precarious contracts 
that could be terminated at any time.80  One inspector described the limitations his short-
term contract posed: “in this position, if you don’t have civil service protection, you are 
prone to all kinds of pressure…you feel somewhat constrained in front of powerful 
corporations.”81  In addition, many inspectors held jobs outside of the STBA to 
supplement their income (a practice that is tolerated).  While there have been efforts to 
hire inspectors with a minimum level of education (unlike in Córdoba), there has been no 
exam system to ensure meritocracy (in fact, the political support for the expansion of the 
inspectorate in 2006 was based, in part, on promises that legislators could influence the 
hiring process).82  In combination, these features indicate that bureaucratic autonomy 
could not have been behind enforcement. 
To explain how enforcement occurred, it is necessary to go beyond bureaucratic 
autonomy and examine the ways by which linkages and administrative resources 
influenced state capacity.  Political influence of organizations in society was pervasive in 
                                                
79 Interview: B13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009 
80 Página/12 “La paradoja de los inspectors” 09/18/08 
81 Interview: B16, Inspector, STBA, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008  
82 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009 
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the STBA, but unlike in Córdoba, the structure of linkages did not privilege unions. For 
example, union leaders could not directly approach inspectors, but instead had to put in 
formal requests to the central inspection office, which then allocated an inspector to the 
task.83  This practice created a friction in the flow of information from unions to 
inspectors, sometimes creating delays in response times by the STBA.  Inspectors 
reported that they would collaborate with unions, but they were careful not to depend 
upon them.  During visits to firms, for instance, the unions had a limited role in providing 
information and helping regulators craft a response.  One inspector recounted that “the 
only thing that union leaders can do is be present.  They cannot intervene.”84  After the 
election of a center-right government at the end of 2007, further restrictions were put into 
place, and inspectors could only work with unions that entered into formal agreements 
with the STBA.85  The survey data (from 2009) provide a more structured way of 
comparing Córdoba and the Federal Capital in terms of inspector-union linkages (Table 
5).  For every question, inspectors in the Federal Capital were more likely than their  
counterparts in Córdoba to say that union leaders “never” or only “sometimes” help with 
enforcement, providing additional evidence for the differences in linkages.86  This 
particular structure of linkages explains why enforcement was not very high in the metal 
industry of the Federal Capital even though the union had resources to offer inspectors, 
and as described below, the inspectors had their own resources.  
Although inspector-union linkages were comparatively weak, inspectors in the 
Federal Capital did have linkages with other types of civil society organizations that 
                                                
83 Interview: B22, STBA, Buenos Aires, 9/15/2008 
84 Interview: B16, Inspector, STBA, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008 
85 Interview: B08, Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 9/23/2008 
86 All but question 3 are statistically significant (chi-squared test, p<=0.001).   
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opened up channels for political influence and provided key resources.87  One such 
organization was La Alameda, a non-union civil society organization competing with a 
union (in this case the garment workers union) to represent workers’ interests.88  La 
Alameda put political pressure on the STBA (protesting and denouncing violations in the 
media) that resulted in leaders of the organization gaining access to the inspectorate.89  
Linkages were able form, in part, because the center-left coalition in power was not 
constrained by partisan ties with unions.  This development contrasted strongly with 
Córdoba, where political alliances between unions and the STC did not leave space for 
other actors to work with inspectors, even after they mobilized. 90 Thus, in these cases 
politics did not influence enforcement directly through hierarchical controls over a 
bureaucracy that executed the tasks of enforcement on its own, but rather indirectly by 
influencing linkage formation.  
Once linkages were established with La Alameda, inspectors could use the group 
for its “ideas and suggestions” to go beyond an “indiscriminate policy of inspection from 
workshop to workshop” in order to have a greater impact.91  At the operational level, La 
Alameda “provided training and taught the garment workers.  [La Alameda] told them 
what their rights are, what to do when a labor inspector comes, how they can collaborate 
                                                
87 There were not substantially more civil society organizations in the Federal Capital than in Córdoba 
(9,000 in the Federal Capital, compared with 12,000 in Córdoba) (Luna and Cecconi 2004).  
88 The garment workers’ union was widely considered to be captured by management and did not push for 
enforcement.  La Alameda attempted to change the union from within by running candidates in elections, 
but was largely unsuccessful.  In Argentina, only one union is certified to represent any given industry. 
89 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009.  On the protests and attention that la 
Alameda was able to generate, see: La Nación “Marcha de trabajadores bolivianos” 04/05/06; “Protesta 
contra el trabajo esclavo” 09/15/06. 
90 Although both the heads of government in Córdoba and the Federal Capital were from the left of the 
political spectrum, the governing coalition in Córdoba had partisan ties with unions that crowded out other 
civil society organizations.  This was not the case in the Federal Capital, in which many unions were part of 
the opposition.  
91 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009 
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with the inspectors.”92  In other words, La Alameda not only lobbied the STBA to 
enforce, but was essential in providing “logistics, and [information] before, during and 
after” inspection operations.93  The structure of linkages was crucial for enabling 
enforcement in the garment industry.  If La Alameda only put political pressure on the 
STBA and did not assist in the operational side of enforcement, it is unlikely that 
inspectors would have been able to enforce in such a systematic and strategic fashion.  If 
inspectors in the STBA had linkages only with unions, as did their colleagues in Córdoba, 
it is unlikely that enforcement would have occurred at such a high level given the lack of 
action by the garment workers’ union.  The garment workers’ union, SOIVA, simply did 
not request many inspections of the STBA;94 an official in the division of the STBA 
responsible for the garment workshops recounted: “To me, the unions don’t come.”95  
Senior officials at the STBA invited SOIVA to participate in the operations and press 
conferences when clandestine firms were discovered and closed, but they did not.96   
The linkages with La Alameda were extremely important, but they alone cannot 
explain why enforcement had such a broad reach.  If inspectors of the STBA worked with 
La Alameda in the same way that the inspectors in Córdoba worked with unions, 
enforcement would be limited to occasions in which La Alameda subsidized inspectors 
by giving them necessary material resources, such as transport and overtime pay.  This 
clearly was not the case, and the STBA went well beyond responding to immediate 
complaints.  To understand how, we need to examine administrative resources.  The 
                                                
92 Interview: B11, Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 & 02/17/09 
93 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009 
94 Auditoria General la Ciudad Buenos Aires. “Informe Final: Dirección General De Protección Del 
Trabajo” 2006. 
95 Interview: B11, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 & 
02/17/09 
96 Interview: B66, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009 
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STBA had an advanced database, which allowed officials to plan and keep track of their 
actions.  This technology made large campaigns targeting workshops, and analysis of the 
results of these campaigns, possible.  The STBA also had a relatively high number of 
inspectors, with one per 15,000 workers (compared with one per 35,000 workers in 
Córdoba).  And in 2007, the Federal Capital created a specialized division within the 
labor inspectorate to enforce only regulations in home-based work.  This change made it 
more probable that inspection capacity would be apportioned to the garment industry, 
even if other industries demanded many inspections.97  Although the inspectors were not 
protected from political interference through civil service protection (or other 
organizational features), they were able to take a broader set of actions when they built a 
coalition that provided political backing.  Furthermore, they did not have to depend 
materially on their partners outside of the state to such a large degree as in Córdoba.  
State capacity for enforcement was created, therefore, through a combination of high 
levels of administrative resources and linkages, instead of through bureaucratic autonomy. 
Conclusion 
 There is a tremendous gap between regulations on the books and the de facto 
protections afforded to workers in most of the world.  Labor inspectors can play a key 
role in strengthening labor market institutions and improving standards through 
enforcement, but they often do not.  Pessimistic about the prospects for enforcement of 
state regulations, many activists have shifted their attention towards non-state initiatives, 
such as private-voluntary regulation and certification schemes (Bartley 2007).  Private 
initiatives, however, have had limited success and show the greatest potential when 
                                                
97 Interview: B11, Senior Official, STBA, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 & 02/17/09 
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combined with capable state regulators (Amengual 2010; Locke 2013).  Dominant 
approaches to studying inspection suggest that the only way to improve enforcement is to 
build strong, preferably autonomous, bureaucracies.  As a result, they offer little guidance 
for short-term improvements in state labor regulation, reinforcing the view that state 
regulation is not a viable response to the challenges of improving labor standards in much 
of the world. 
This paper has shown that analyzing labor inspection primarily in terms of 
autonomy is at best incomplete.  First, notwithstanding problems of political interference, 
patronage, and limited resources, labor inspectors can, and do, undertake the key steps of 
enforcement.  As a result, there is considerable variation in enforcement among 
inspectorates that are highly imperfect.  These differences in enforcement have been 
obscured by common methods of measurement, which focus either on regulatory styles 
or inspection counts.  Closer investigation reveals differences in patterns of 
enforcement—how states allocate enforcement—and the intensity of enforcement in any 
given industry even when regulators conduct similar numbers of inspections overall or 
have similar styles.  Detecting this variation goes hand in hand with developing 
explanations for enforcement that go beyond autonomy. 
Second, as the cases presented above illustrate, enforcement can be made possible, 
and state capacity extended, by establishing linkages between inspectors and pro-
enforcement societal groups that allow inspectors to mobilize the resources of these 
groups.  By identifying the factors that allow constrained inspectors to implement 
regulations, it is possible to locate opportunities for enforcement in a much broader range 
of contexts than is commonly understood.   Wherever there is a pro-enforcement societal 
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group, linkages may be key to creating the conditions for state action, even in highly 
imperfect states.  Policy makers should not conclude that states will invariably fail when 
they lack the ability to allocate resources and undertake reforms to regulatory 
bureaucracies.  In addition, societal groups that seek to improve labor standards should 
not simply place political pressure on the state, but should work to develop linkages with 
regulators in order to share material resources and information.   
Expanding regulatory capacity by mobilizing resources in society is not limited to 
Argentine cases.  A similar mechanism was found by Fine and Gordon (2010), who 
propose revitalizing partnerships between enforcement agencies and worker 
organizations in the United States.  This pathway is also broadly congruent with research 
from other policy domains, in which combinations of actors across state and society 
strengthen institutions (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Braithwaite 2006).  Collectively, these 
findings suggest that labor inspection research should be reoriented away from an 
exclusive focus on reforming bureaucratic organization and move towards identifying 
factors that influence linkage formation.98  In doing so, researchers can build on studies 
of politics in emerging markets that take a broader view of state capacity and offer a 
series of hypotheses about the political origins of distinct configurations of state-society 
relations (Montero 2001).  
With these opportunities, however, come many challenges.  Enforcement that 
relies heavily on organizations outside of the state can have serious limitations.  When 
the inspectors are completely dependent on society for enforcement, inequalities in social 
organization become exacerbated.  Responses to social demands can crowd out strategic 
                                                
98 For an analysis of linkage formation, see: (Amengual 2011) 
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state action, potentially leaving the most vulnerable workers unprotected.  Moreover, 
enforcement through linkages can be fragile; if relationships between inspectors and their 
allies outside of the state are severed, the agency becomes crippled.  For these reasons, it 
remains an important goal to allocate resources to labor inspectorates.  However, the 
challenge is not to build labor inspectorates ex novo, but to foster transitions between 
state dependence on societal organizations towards an ultimate goal of strengthening both 
the internal and external components of state capacity.  As research on labor inspection 
moves beyond a narrow view of the depoliticized state, it will be possible to understand a 
fuller range of strategies for improving enforcement.  And when more states can give 
firms the incentives and ability to comply with regulations, there will be greater 
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